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CAROLINE YEOH* AND WONG SIANG YEUNG**        
 
  The Singapore economy’s “success story” has traditionally been 
underscored by state-led, market-driven intervention. The state enterprise strategy 
involved the establishment of industrial parks in China, India and several South-
East Asian countries. These overseas projects sought to extend Singapore’s 
economic boundaries by exploiting comparative advantages that each region had to 
offer, so as to achieve sustainable economic development for the city-state. This 
paper revisits Singapore’s flagship projects in Indonesia and India. It finds that 
the strategic objectives associated with the development of these parks are only 
partially achieved. The paper concludes that, while the Singapore government’s 
role in developing, managing and operating these overseas industrial parks is 
crucial from the start, differing agendas, sometimes within the same host 
government, intertwined with the cultural and political complexities of large 
foreign economies, and the uncontrolled external environment, serve to diminish 
the efficiency and commercial viability of such state-sponsored entrepreneurship 
ventures.  
 
 
Introduction 
 
  The Singapore model of economic development is a variation of the 
“development state model” (Evans 1995, Woo-Cumings 1999) – economic 
restructuring, industrial transformation, and rapid economic growth are achieved 
through “collaborations” with multinational enterprises (MNEs) rather than with 
local industrial enterprises. The early stages of the city-state’s development 
proved to be hugely successful. The adoption of a free enterprise, open-door 
policy led to a heavy influx of foreign direct investments, mainly MNEs. Strategic 
partnerships with these MNEs ensured steady economic growth and jobs for its 
people However, by the mid-1980s, rising business costs meant that it was 
imperative to re-engineer the economy towards higher value-added activities in 
order to realize its vision of becoming a regional center for advanced technology 
(Lim 1984). Despite liberal financial and tax incentives, few MNEs were willing 
to upgrade their operations, and continued to shift their labor-intensive and low 
value-added operations out of Singapore (Kumar and Lee 1991). Facing an 
uncertain economic future, the Singaporean government chose to evolve from a 
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  State-led infrastructure projects and a genre of selective interventions 
(Yeoh et al. 2004a), incentives, and innovations were designed to assist local and 
Singapore-based MNEs to redistribute their operations to production sites in the 
region (Okposin 1999, Perry and Yeoh 2000, Blomqvist 2002, Sitathan 2002, 
Yeung 2002) and to upgrade their operations in Singapore to higher-end activities, 
utilizing the unique set of benefits and competencies offered by each location. 
Customized to accommodate resource-dependant operations of firms, it was 
envisaged that these industrial parks would enhance the collective 
competitiveness of Singapore-based companies, as well as Singapore’s own 
competitiveness as a high-value investment location with strategic linkages to the 
region (Figure 1). This not only enhances the cost-competitiveness of firms, but 
develops Singapore into a high-value investment hub with strategic linkages to 
resource-abundant locations in the region, effectively manipulating the regional 
economic geography to expand the city-state’s economic space through a 
symbiotic relationship with its neighbors. To augment the location advantages of 
the strategic sites, Singapore lends its reputation and competitive strengths in 
infrastructural development and management to the regional sites, potentially 
bringing about “developmental effects” in the host environments (Pereira 2003). 
 
 
Figure 1: Singapore’s Transborder Industrialization 
 
 
 
      Adapted from Singapore Unlimited (Singapore Economic Development Board, 1995) 
 
 
  This paper examines the extent to which such state-sponsored 
entrepreneurship ventures can extend economic boundaries and help a home 
economy and its firms cope with shifting comparative advantages and exploit 
national competitive advantages developed during earlier phases of economic 
development. The paper will focus, specifically, on the first overseas industrial 
township project, in Batam Island, Indonesia, and the most recent project, in 
Bangalore, India’s IT capital. Further background on the impetus behind the 
regionalization initiative is presented in the next section, followed by an account of the origins and progress of the case study parks. The flagship projects are then 
evaluated in terms of the progress in attracting investment, the contributions to the 
strategic objectives associated with the parks, as well as to Singapore’s broader 
regionalization initiative. The analysis is reinforced by empirical data from our 
on-site surveys of the parks’ tenants, and in-depth case studies of selected tenants 
in both locations. The final sections consider the implications of these experiences 
for Singapore’s regionalization program, and evaluate the city-state’s determined 
efforts to harness synergistic complementarities in its strategy to restructure the 
Singapore economy. 
 
 
Regionalization and the Singapore Economy 
 
  The city-state of Singapore has continually sought to overcome its 
resource limitations by extending its economic hinterland beyond its national 
boundaries. Singapore’s global outreach, supported by constant economic reform 
and its competitive strengths, has allowed it to achieve remarkable economic 
growth in a relatively short span of time. The mid-1960s saw the beginnings of 
the Singapore government’s aggressive approach to woo foreign MNEs to fuel the 
city-state’s economic development (Mirza 1986, Pang 1987, Rodan 1989, Regnier 
1991, Huff 1995, Pereira 2000). However, by the early 1980s, rising business 
costs at home and increasing competition from low-cost, labor-abundant countries 
in the region made it imperative for Singapore to shift away from labor-intensive 
activities. The government initiated a major industrial restructuring, which saw 
Singapore transforming itself into a hub for MNEs engaged in higher value-added 
manufacturing activities (Krause 1987, Lim et al. 1988).  
 Pari  passu, Singapore’s economic planners sought to expand the island's 
investment horizons through an overseas direct investment program launched in 
1988.
4  The main ideas were set out in the policy document Gearing Up for an 
Enhanced Role in the Global Economy (Singapore Economic Development Board 
(SEDB) 1988). The 1990 Global Strategies Conference added new dimensions to 
these deliberations (SEDB 1990). Capitalizing on the liberalization of foreign 
investment controls and high growth rates in the Asia-Pacific region, Singapore 
looked to develop its “external wing” by investing in countries across Asia (Wong 
and Ng 1991, Regnier 1993, Mahizhnan 1994, Murray and Pereira 1995, Pang 
1995, Okposin 1999, Blomqvist 2002). Singapore’s regionalization program 
involved, among others elements,
5   the establishment of industrial parks in 
emerging economies in the Asian region that replicated the business environment 
found in Singapore (Perry and Yeoh 2000). These industrial parks were marketed 
as a propitious synergy of location-specific advantages and Singapore’s strengths 
in infrastructural development and management. The industrial parks were 
established based on the premise that they would allow Singapore-based firms to 
maintain access to low-cost, resource-abundant centers for their resource-
dependent operations while conducting higher value-added operations in 
Singapore. The strategic repositioning was discussed at the 1993 Regionalization Forum and encapsulated in the policy document Singapore Unlimited (SEDB 
1993a, 1995a, 1995b). 
  The government’s role in the township developments was three-pronged. 
First, senior politicians and civil servants negotiated the institutional framework 
for the project, which typically involved garnering special investment conditions 
in the host location. The stress on exploiting personal ties accords with business 
practice preferred by the linked communities of “overseas Chinese” (Hamilton 
1991, East Asia Analytical Unit 1995, Brown 1998, Yeung 2002), the “bamboo 
network” which Singapore made use of in its industrial parks in Indonesia and 
China. Second, Singapore government agencies and government-linked 
companies (GLCs) were the prime investors in the infrastructure and real estate 
development, usually via a “government-selected” consortium (Zutshi and 
Gibbons 1998). Third, senior politicians were aggressively involved in the 
promotion of the parks, while the Singapore Economic Development Board took 
on the role of “business architect” by encouraging foreign multinationals to locate 
their regional headquarters in Singapore and by redistributing lower-end 
operations to the industrial parks. The government also initiated a series of 
platforms for strategic discussions and collaborations to market Singapore’s 
overseas industrial parks (SEDB 1993b). The case-study parks in Indonesia and 
India, along with other similar parks in China and Vietnam, are examples of this 
mode of regionalization. 
  Batamindo Industrial Park (BIP), the first overseas industrial township 
developed by Singapore and launched in 1992, was instigated as a one-time 
project to provide additional low cost production space at a time when 
Singapore's strong recovery from the mid-1980s recession was accentuating land 
and labor shortages. The initial success in establishing BIP provided further 
justification and support for government leadership in infrastructure projects 
through selective interventionist policies. It subsequently became the model for 
other townships developed under the regionalization program, such as the Bintan 
Industrial Estate (BIE) in Bintan Island, Indonesia, and the Vietnam-Singapore 
Industrial Park (VSIP) in Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam. The regionalization 
strategy was further encouraged when the then-Chinese premier Deng Xiaoping 
invited Singapore’s then-Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew to develop a model 
industrial township to test the feasibility of transplanting Singapore's methods to 
China. This ambition reflected the goal of developing a township to test the 
effectiveness of the Singapore approach to social and economic development in 
China. This goal was encouraged by Deng, who regarded Singapore as “a 
capitalist version of the communist dream.” The project was endorsed in an inter-
governmental agreement in 1994 to develop the China-Singapore Suzhou 
Industrial Park (CS-SIP). The project invitation envisaged both infrastructure 
provision and the transfer of “software” associated with Singapore’s social and 
economic policies. It provided a pseudo-political motive to the regionalization 
strategy – to enhance Singapore’s reputation for efficient, non-corrupt 
administration and reliable infrastructure and for its ability to export its economic 
model to a large country like China.   While most of Singapore’s initial infrastructure projects were situated in 
low-cost labor-dependent economies such as Indonesia, Vietnam, and China, the 
rise of the service and information technology sectors initiated the move into 
India in 1994, and the timing could not have been better. The early 1990s saw 
India throwing its doors open to foreign investment as part of a determined 
liberalization procedure intended to boost economic growth, akin to what 
Singapore had done in its early years of development. Singapore’s attempt to ride 
on the information technology wave led to the setting up of the International 
Technology Park Limited (ITPL) in Bangalore, the country’s IT capital.  
 
 
Singapore’s Overseas Industrial Parks 
 
Batamindo Industrial Park (BIP), Indonesia 
  Talks between Indonesia and Singapore to cooperate in Batam’s 
development had been a frequent occurrence during the early 1980s without 
producing significant results. One stumbling block was Singapore's preference for 
regulatory concessions. It took until the late 1980s for mutual agreement to be 
rendered; a time when Singapore's priority was additional production space and 
Indonesia was prepared to extend foreign investment concessions to kick start 
Batam's development
6  (Yeoh 1990, Perry 1991, Regnier 1991). Since 1992, 
foreign companies in Batam were exempted from the need to devolve a share of 
ownership to Indonesian partners, the number of sectors closed to foreign 
investors was reduced, and greater opportunity was available for foreign industry 
to locate outside of bonded industrial estates. The island’s duty-free status was 
amended to facilitate a proportion of output to be exported to other parts of 
Indonesia. Investment risks were reduced by allowing foreign companies to 
manage industrial estates, providing the opportunity for the Singapore 
government-linked companies to set up the joint venture to develop and manage 
BIP. 
  BIP was launched in 1992. The park started as a joint-venture between 
Singapore’s GLCs
7  and the Salim Group of Indonesia. Salim was Indonesia’s 
largest business conglomerate at the time, and had close links to senior politicians 
and privileged access to the major investment projects in the Riau Islands (Sato 
1993, Hill 1996). Singaporean GLCs were given control over the development 
and management of the parks, while Salim’s role was to facilitate operations and 
to provide a guarantee of priority over regulatory controls and administrative 
approvals. Singapore’s reputation for transparent and efficient management of 
projects lent further credibility to the projects and maximized marketing leverage 
over Singapore-based multinationals (Yeoh et al. 1992, Naidu 1994, Grundy-Warr 
et al. 1999). 
  BIP was envisaged as a self-contained environment, with its 
communication and business linkages through Singapore rather than through 
Indonesia. BIP, for instance, has its own power supply, water treatment plant, 
sewerage system, telecommunications facilities, and social amenities. These, 
together with the location advantages that Indonesia offers, has resulted in an investment enclave offering facilities close to conditions in Singapore, in marked 
contrast to the conditions immediately outside the parks.  
  BIP’s first tenants were mainly subsidiaries of American, European, and 
Japanese multinationals already operating in Singapore. Cumulative investments 
and export value in BIP topped US $1 billion and US $2 billion, respectively, in 
2002, and the number of confirmed tenants increased from 17 in 1991 to 82 in 
2003. Of these, 39 were Japanese companies, with Singapore-owned companies 
the next largest concentration at 25. American and European investors have a 
limited presence. There is a concentration of electronics operations, mainly 
various component assembly processes, and supporting activities to the 
electronics sector such as plastic molding and packaging. Out of a total workforce 
of 65,000, over 85% are female, most aged from 18-22. Table 1A shows the 
operational statistics in BIP, while Table 1B shows the tenant profile by origin 
and Table 1C the tenant profile by sector. BIP proved to be profitable, and several 
similar industrial parks were spawned in Indonesia (BIE), Vietnam (VSIP), and 
China (CS-SIP and the Wuxi-Singapore Industrial Park), although these 
encountered more challenges. 
 
 
Table 1A: Batamindo Industrial Park - Operational Statistics (June 2003) 
                              
General Information 
 
Investment by Developer 
 
Committed Tenants 
 
Area Taken Up 
 
Investment by Tenants 
 
Annual Export Value (for 2002) 
     
    No. of Employees 
 
US$470 million 
 
82 
 
320 hectares 
 
> US$1 billion 
 
> US$2 billion 
 
65,000 
 
 
            Source: SembCorp Industries. 
 
Table 1B: Batamindo Industrial Park – Tenant Profile by Country of Origin 
(June 2003) 
Country Percent 
USA 9 
Japan 48 
Europe 11 
Singapore 30 
  
  Source: Batamindo Industrial Park, Tenants’ List, June 2003 
                               
            
Table 1C: Batamindo Industrial Park – Tenant Profile by Sector (June 2003) 
 
Sector Percent  Sector  Percent 
Electronics 44  Packaging   6 
Precision Parts  15  Medical  4 
Plastic moulding  11  Pharmaceuticals  1 
Electrical 11  Others  9 
 
  Source: Batamindo Industrial Park, Tenants’ List, June 2003 
 
 
International Technology Park Limited (ITPL), Bangalore, India 
  While BIP was essentially set up as a low-cost economic enclave, the 
motive behind the setting up of ITPL was decidedly different. India put forward 
numerous location-specific advantages that prompted Singapore to set up an 
industrial park in Bangalore. The cheap and plenteous availability of both skilled 
and unskilled labor and the abundant land resources, combined with the 
cooperative and encouraging attitude of the Indian government, would translate 
into a myriad of advantages for the city-state if some of its operations were to 
relocate to India. The information technology boom accompanied by the vast 
disposal of IT facilities and highly-skilled software specialists presented an 
avenue for building a technology park wherein high-end activities could take 
place. Hence, while other parks catered for manufacturing and other activities 
within the “operations” realm of the value chain, ITPL provided Singapore with 
the unique set of advantages that blended low-cost and high-end activities at the 
same time so that firms could integrate their different value chain activities in a 
single location. 
  The idea to create a Singapore-style park was first mooted by Singapore’s 
then-Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong and India’s former Premier P.V. Narashima 
Rao, in 1992. Construction commenced in September 1994, and the park was 
officially inaugurated in 2000. ITPL is located 18km away from Bangalore in 
India’s Silicon Valley.
8   The partners in the ITPL project were a Singapore 
consortium of companies
9 led by Ascendas International, the Tata Group, and the 
Karnataka state government in a 40-40-20 arrangement. The Karnataka state 
government has since reduced its stake to 6%, while the Singapore consortium, 
and the Tata Group have increased their respective stakes to 47% each. 
  Marketed aggressively as an environment that “cuts through the red tape 
and bottlenecks that are a part of India’s infrastructure and operating 
environment” (The Straits Times, August 8, 1999), ITPL was slated to provide 
total business space solutions to multinationals and other conglomerates within a 
state-of-the-art technology park. More distinctively, ITPL guarantees 
uninterrupted power supply and telecommunication facilities, immediate-
occupancy business incubator space, and the formulaic “one-stop” service. Its 
futuristic design comes complete with value-added services like business/office 
support centers, medical center, food court, restaurants, and recreation and fitness centers. ITPL also houses the Indian Institute of Information Technology, which 
provides professional and skilled manpower for the park’s tenants. Operating 
profits have been registered, and ITPL is projected to break even within the next 
four years.     
  The blend of location-specific advantages such as technology and 
infrastructure on one hand, and competitive skilled labor on the other, led to high 
value-added activities taking place at ITPL. Its earliest clients included SAP Labs, 
First Ring and 24/7. As of January 2003, there were 100 confirmed tenants, of 
which 93 were operational, with 8500 employees. More than half of these tenants 
were represented by wholly or partially foreign-owned firms, which included 
some well-known global players like AT&T, IBM, Motorola, Sony, Texas 
Instruments, Citicorp, and Thomas Cook. The industries there included software 
development, business process outsourcing, and manufacturing.  
  Both BIP and ITPL reflect an “industry cluster” strategy. BIP contains a 
cluster of electronic firms (50%) while ITPL reflects a concentration of software 
and e-service based firms (70%). However, the difference is that while 91% of 
firms in BIP are engaged in manufacturing activity, the corresponding percentage 
in ITPL is only 10%. Table 2A shows the operational statistics in ITPL, Table 2B 
shows the tenant profile by country of origin, and Table 2C shows the tenant 
profile by sector. 
 
 
Table 2A: International Technology Park Limited - Operational Statistics 
(June 2003) 
 
General Information 
Scale of Development 
Developed Area 
Total Investment Value 
Confirmed Tenants 
Operating Tenants 
Area 
Park Population 
 
About 70 acres 
1.6 million sq ft 
SG$200 Million 
100 
93 
1.4 million sq ft. 
8,500 
 
 
  Source: Ascendas International     
 
Table 2B: International Technology Park Limited –  
Tenant Profile by Country of Origin (June 2003) 
 
Country Percent 
USA 42 
India 36 
Europe 16 
Asia 6 
            Source: Ascendas International       
 
 
Table 2C: International Technology Park Limited – Tenant Profile by Sector 
(June 2003) 
 
Sector Percent  Sector  Percent 
Software Development  49  IC Design  3 
BPO/ITES 24  R&D  1 
Biotech/Bio-Informatics 3  Educational  Institutions 2 
Manufacturing 10  Others  8 
                                                                
  Source: Ascendas International     
 
 
Empirical Data 
 
  Much of the analysis on the parks has relied primarily on secondary data 
from official publications, press reports, etc. To obtain primary data on the 
differential impact of various pull factors on firms’ investment decisions, along 
with the differential impact of different types of constraints on their operations, 
we applied a modified version of the questionnaire developed in Yeoh et al. 
(2000) to the tenants in ITPL in December 2002 and June 2003, and, for BIP, in 
July 2003. The first set of questions sought to determine the profile of the 
respondents: type of ownership, nature of operations, and size of establishment; 
and the second set was structured to gather information on the push-pull factors 
affecting the investment decisions of the tenants. Other questions pertaining to the 
respondents’ views on the facilities and services in the Parks were culled from the 
open-ended questions. A total of 60 responses (27 from BIP and 33 from ITPL) 
were collected. The sample represented 34.6% of BIP tenants and 36.7% of ITPL 
tenants at the time of survey, and the profile of the sample closely matched that of 
the population. 
 
Statistical treatment of survey results 
  Apart from analyzing the descriptive statistics and popular rankings on the 
responses related to factors and constraints, logit analysis was used to compare 
the push/pull factors influencing the tenants’ decision to locate in the Parks. The 
logit model, estimated by the maximum likelihood, takes the following form: 
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where Pi is the probability of a firm being located in the particular park 
           exp refers to the exponentiation operator, and 
           Zi is a linear function of the push/pull factors
 defined as   
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where  F1 = 1 if “Political commitment from the Singapore government” is 
selected, 0 otherwise  
      F2 = 1 if “Political commitment from the host country government” is 
selected, 0 otherwise 
      F3 = 1 if “Investment incentives” is selected, 0 otherwise 
      F4 = 1 if “Competitive labor costs” is selected, 0 otherwise 
      F5 = 1 if “Reliable infrastructure facilities” is selected, 0 otherwise 
      F6 = 1 if “Access to domestic market” is selected, 0 otherwise 
      α0 = constant term 
                   αi = coefficient of independent (explanatory) variable 
 
  Estimated coefficients in the logit model, if statistically significant (as 
indicated by the p-values), would suggest that the firm choosing that particular 
push/pull factor is more likely to be from BIP than from ITPL.  
  A similar logit model was applied to each type of constraint (Labor, 
Organizational/Technological, and Environmental) faced by the Parks’ tenants: 
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where  Pi is the probability of firm being located in the particular park 
      exp refers to the exponentiation operator, and 
      Zi is a linear function of the constraints
 defined as  
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where  Ci = 1 if the i
th constraint within that type is selected, 0 otherwise  
      β 0 = constant term 
                   β i = coefficient of independent (explanatory) variable 
 
  In this case, estimated coefficients in the logit model, if statistically 
significant, would suggest that the firm choosing that particular constraint is more 
likely to be from BIP than from ITPL.  
  Results from our logit models are presented in Tables 3 and 4. 
 
 
 
 
 
 Table 3: Factors Influencing the Respondents’ Decisions to Invest in 
BIP/ITPL 
 
Popular Ranking
   
Maximum Likelihood 
Estimates 
- Binary Logits
 
BIP ITPL 
 
Variables
 
α i  p-value Frequency Rank  Frequency Rank 
 
Political commitment from 
Singapore government 
 
 
1.422 
 
 
0.237 
    
 
Political commitment from 
host country government 
1.992 0.058* 
    
Investment incentives  1.253  0.291 
    
Competitive labor costs  4.274  0.003*** 
 
    
Availability of 
skilled/educated labor  -0.644 0.622 
 
    
Reliable infrastructure 
Facilities  -1.124 0.424 
    
 
Constant (α0) 
-4.504 0.010*** 
    
 
 
17 
 
 
21 
 
 
16 
 
 
22 
 
 
 
16 
 
 
 
23 
 
 
4 
 
 
3 
 
 
5 
 
 
2 
 
 
 
5 
 
 
 
1 
 
 
6 
 
 
6 
 
 
14 
 
 
1 
 
 
 
12 
 
 
 
27 
 
 
4 
 
 
4 
 
 
2 
 
 
5 
 
 
 
3 
 
 
 
1 
 
Note:
 ψ Estimated values were taken from “forced entry” regression. 
           
φ p-values are for 2-tailed tests. 
           *** Significant at 1% level 
           ** Significant at 5% level 
          * Significant at 10% level 
 
Source: Questionnaire surveys Table 4 Major Constraints on the Respondents’ Operations in BIP/ITPL 
 
Popular Ranking
  Maximum 
Likelihood 
Estimates 
- Binary Logits
 
BIP  ITPL  Variables
 
α i  p-value Frequency Rank  Frequency  Rank 
                                                                     
Labor Constraints         
Shortage of semi-skilled and skilled 
labor  2.770 0.024**  11  3  3  4 
            
Shortage of professionals and 
managers  -0.182 0.865  10  4  4  3 
            
Rising labor costs  2.283  0.021**  21  1  7  1 
            
Industrial relations problems  3.330  0.002*** 17  2  3  4 
            
Others 1.235  0.336  4  5  7  1 
            
Constant (β 0) -6.237  0.004***        
            
            
Organizational and Technological 
Constraints         
Difficulty in obtaining capital 
 equipment  1.246 0.226  5  4  3  4 
            
Difficulty in introducing new 
 technology and techniques  2.541 0.009*** 11  3  3  4 
            
Lack of good supporting services  2.504  0.007*** 13  2  4  2 
            
Difficulty in securing funds for 
 expansion  1.699 0.135  4  5  2  6 
            
High and/or rising overhead costs  0.914  0.303  20  1  16  1 
            
Others -18.831  0.999  0  6  4  2 
            
Constant (β 0) 12.592  0.999         
            Table 4, cont. 
 
            
Environmental Constraints         
Impact of host government regulations 2.312  0.018**  11  1  8  1 
            
Competition from overseas industry 
competitors  2.920 0.001*** 11  1  4  3 
            
Others -2.705  0.084*  7  3  6  2 
            
Constant (β 0) 0.051  0.971         
            
 
Note:
 ψ Estimated values were taken from “forced entry” regression. 
          
φ p-values are for 2-tailed tests. 
       *** Significant at 1% level 
         ** Significant at 5% level 
          * Significant at 10% level 
Source: Questionnaire Surveys 
 
 
 
Case Studies 
 
  Interviews were also conducted with selected companies operating in each 
of the industrial parks, to understand the unique circumstances facing these 
companies. Porter (1994, 2000), among others, has argued that not only should 
the production process be viewed as a value chain, but also that firms should 
identify comparative or location-specific advantages unique to each 
country/territory, which will serve to complement the competitive and firm-
specific advantages specific to their core functions. Furthermore, according to 
rationalization theories, firms should situate their operations in different locations 
to capitalize on the comparative advantages offered in each location. Synergistic 
efforts will occur when a strategic fit between the competitive and comparative 
advantages exist. Singapore’s involvement in BIP and ITPL represents an effort to 
synergize superior infrastructure and efficient and transparent management 
practices, with the location-specific advantages of the case-study parks. The 
underlying intention is to create an enclave, within a more uncertain environment, 
where firms can exploit location-specific advantages with greater ease and 
security. 
  To address this aspect of our research, we present case studies of eight 
firms located in the case-study parks to draw out empirical insights on the 
dynamics of the case-study parks as centers for value-added activities, inter alia, 
the strategic fit between the value-added chain of the firms and the competitive 
advantages of the sites. 
 
  
 
Case studies of BIP firms 
 
Company A (Electronics) 
  Company A is part of a US-based conglomerate. The subsidiary in Batam 
is under the electronics arm of the conglomerate. The existing Batam operations 
started in 1992, but belonged to a competitor German electronics components 
manufacturer, which located to BIP to take advantage of the stable infrastructure 
and low labor costs. In October 2000, Company A acquired its rival and took over 
all its manufacturing operations, including the facility in BIP. It has since become 
a leading maker of passive electronic components such as automotive relays and 
connectors. The BIP operations currently employ 560 workers and occupy 4,500 
square meters. The company sources its inputs from around the world, and the 
facility in BIP is mainly for production. The final products are shipped to the US, 
Australia and some parts of ASEAN.  
  The company praises the one-stop service provided by the park’s 
management, citing the efficient and transparent administration as a boon to its 
operations, by providing a more stable operating environment. However, being 
primarily labor-intensive, the company is feeling the impact of the rising labor 
and overhead costs on its operations. Specifically, it would like to see more 
efforts made to lower the operating overheads, such as having variable electricity 
rates.  
 
Company B (Crystal oscillators) 
  Company B is a 100% owned Japanese firm that produces crystal 
oscillators. It occupies 6,000 square meters of space in BIP, and is serviced by a 
workforce of 432 employees. The company manufactures about 100 various types 
of oscillators to be used in an array of products, from clocks to cell phones. 
Production and outbound logistics are administered mainly in Batam, with the 
parent base in Japan engaged in the research and development of new technology.  
  The company located its production facility to BIP in 1997, drawn by the 
cheap rent, utilities, and labor. Other pull factors included the strength of BIP’s 
infrastructure and the provision of medical and legal services. These strengths 
outweighed the perceived weaknesses of BIP, which included poor traffic 
conditions, restricted telecommunications services brought about by the country’s 
monopoly, and the uncertainty brought about by terrorism. 
  The company suffered losses for their 2002 financial year, attributed to the 
September 11 attacks and the region’s instability, which further pushed down 
investors’ confidence. The volatile mobile phone market, coupled with economic 
uncertainty has forced the company to reassess its investment in BIP. In a bid to 
maintain its cost competitiveness, the company aims to streamline its production 
processes, and employ advanced technology. It remains optimistic of a potential 
buoyant economy, fueled by the reduction of leading economies’ interest rates in 
a bid to spur consumer spending, which bodes well for its overseas markets.  
 Company C (Electronic switches) 
  Company C is a Singapore-Switzerland joint venture in the electronics 
contract manufacturing industry, primarily involved in printed circuit board 
assembly and box-build assembly. Many of its products, such as refrigerator 
switches, are used in industry as intermediate products. Their BIP operation 
employs about 200 workers, and occupies one medium-sized factory. All its 
products are exported out of Indonesia. 
  The company cites the competitive costs of unskilled labor and overheads 
and political commitment and incentives from the Indonesian government as pull 
factors which drew it to BIP. In particular, it singled out the reliable infrastructure 
as the park’s greatest strength. It was also quite satisfied with the one-stop service 
provided by the park. 
  However, though labor was cheap, the company felt that productivity was 
lacking and its operations were often disrupted by industrial relations problems. 
The higher overhead costs were also a concern. Though the one-stop service was 
commendable, the company still felt stifled by red tape as new technologies could 
not be easily imported.  
 
Company D (Adhesives) 
  Company D is a wholly-owned subsidiary of a Singapore-based company, 
which in turn is affiliated with a larger Japanese conglomerate. The company is a 
manufacturer of a diverse range of adhesives for both domestic and industrial 
usage. It is also involved in the manufacture of the aluminum packaging for its 
adhesive products. Its manufacturing facility in BIP was set up in 1996, and 
involved the shifting of all activities purely related to manufacturing from 
Singapore, where labor costs were eroding their profitability. All inputs for its 
operations were imported from Singapore. The company does not have a license 
to export its products, so it ships all final products back to Singapore for re-export. 
It currently employs 150 workers and occupies two medium-sized factories. 
  Although the management acknowledges the reliable and stable 
infrastructure, it is generally displeased with the high cost of utilities, and feels 
that the premium charged is excessive compared to the benefits obtained from 
such basic necessities. Labor costs were lower in BIP, but there had been many 
industrial disputes that caused much uncertainty to its operations and strained 
relations between the company and its workers. Workers’ unions wielded 
considerable power in negotiations and often disrupted the company’s production 
schedule. Moreover, although labor costs were low, absenteeism was high and the 
workers’ poor work ethic affected productivity. Labor laws were also deemed to 
be too protective towards workers.  
 
Case studies of ITPL firms 
 
Company E (Inter-enterprise software) 
  Company E is a wholly-owned subsidiary of an international software 
giant. Its German parent is recognized as the world leader in providing 
collaborative business solutions for all types of industries and major markets. Initially a small German outfit operating in Bangalore’s Koramangala district, it 
was taken over in 1998 in a move that was accompanied by a shift into ITPL. One 
of the first occupiers, it was also the park’s largest tenant in terms of space 
occupancy. The company initially had a choice of relocating itself to ITPL or to 
other city locations that required only one-fourth the rent. The company chose 
ITPL, despite its higher rents, largely due to the following critical advantages that 
ITPL provided: uninterrupted power supply, state-of the-art infrastructure, ease 
and speed of setting up shop, and excellent communication channels. The 
company’s operation within the park is in software development, and is a “100% 
export unit.” All its exports go to Germany. 
  In the four years since its inception, it has grown from 70 employees to 
over 500 employees. Space constraints within the park have forced the company 
to consider other locations. ITPL has been unable to cater to the growing and 
irregular needs of the company, being a park suited for small and medium-sized 
enterprises. With its rapid expansion, Company E no longer views ITPL’s costly 
rents as an expense that can be justified; the company has since relocated into an 
expansive new 15-acre campus. Furthermore, the company views such a shift as 
an opportunity to establish its own identity, which it had not fully experienced in 
a multi-tenanted place like ITPL. However, given ITPL’s “distinct” advantages, 
the company continues to retain office space in the park’s new Built-To-Suit 
facilities. 
 
Company F (Business process outsourcing) 
  Company F is an American-based firm undertaking e-services. Its key 
operations in the park include call centers, real-time customer service 
management, and technical support to foreign firms. Catering to customers like 
Alta Vista, the company has conducted successful programs such as outbound 
telemarketing, inbound phone customer service, and inbound phone technical 
service, with service areas spanning countries worldwide, particularly the U.S. 
and Europe. 
  ITPL, with its facilities best suited for small and medium-sized enterprises 
engaged largely in R&D and in the service industry, has become an “incubator” 
for companies involved in Business Process Outsourcing (BPO). Located at the 
“Creator” building of ITPL, Company F is one of many such companies. 
Established in the park in April 2000, the company has over 800 employees. 
  ITPL’s regular power supply, 24-hour speedy connectivity, and plug-and-
play services were the distinguishing pull factors for the company. Additionally, 
Bangalore’s colleges and universities provide a ready pool of potential employees, 
which, for company F, is an added advantage in carrying out its operations from 
ITPL. 
 
Company G (Business process outsourcing) 
  Company G is a wholly American owned firm, incorporated in May 1999 
as a 100% subsidiary. Its facility within the park spreads over 42,000 square feet 
and employs 12,000 employees. The company’s functions within the park largely focus on Business Process Outsourcing, which includes both inbound and 
outbound customer care. 
  As in the case of other companies in the same industry, Company G, too, 
cites the permanent power supply, 24-hour connectivity and supporting 
infrastructure as the vital factors that prompted it to situate in the park. The 
company also employs a sizeable portion of the IT graduates that Bangalore 
churns out every year. In addition, the firm perceives ITPL’s professional support 
services and maintenance programs as a distinct advantage over other locations. 
However, the company has expressed reservations over the numerous other call 
centers making their way into ITPL to make use of the same advantages; this 
escalates into other problems such as heightened competition, further sharing of 
resources, and the “the pool of entry-level people getting smaller.” 
 
Company H (Travel and financial services) 
  Company H is one of the world's leading international travel and financial 
services groups and serves over 20 million customers a year. It provides services 
at 4,500 locations in more than 100 countries and employs over 20,000 people. 
The company’s Indian subsidiary has a network of 54 locations in 16 cities across 
India.  
  Company H is one of the very few companies that were approached by the 
ITPL management itself to set up shop at the park, largely to provide travel, credit 
card and foreign exchange services. Company H is a small entity with only five 
employees. However, it has managed to secure a large customer base due to the 
fact that it is the only tenant providing such services within the park. Moreover, 
the company also caters to an increasing number of firms outside the park who 
find it convenient to visit its office in the park, which is in close proximity, 
instead of approaching its other branches placed in the city center. 
 
 
Findings and Analysis 
 
The pre-investment lure of BIP/ITPL (Table 3) 
  Singapore leverages on its infrastructural development expertise and the 
location-specific advantages available in the host environments to market its 
industrial parks. It supplements these purported advantages with its political 
commitment to the Parks, as demonstrated by the many bilateral agreements 
between the GLCs and host governments, or politically-linked business 
conglomerates, and a host of investment incentives to entice multinationals to 
locate their activities to these self-contained enclaves. While BIP offered 
businesses cheap labor for their low value-added activities, ITPL, with its skilled-
manpower base and competitive labor costs, could facilitate activities higher up 
the value chain. 
 
Cheap labor 
  Competitive labor costs were a major pull factor for BIP tenants compared 
to ITPL tenants, as indicated by the positive and statistically significant α4 (= 4.274). This is expected since BIP serves as a low-cost investment enclave, and a 
large proportion (71%) of the tenants in BIP engage in manufacturing activities. 
Manufacturing being labor intensive inherently requires low-cost labor. ITPL 
tenants, who are primarily in the services sector, also value cheap labor, but do 
not require it in the sheer amounts that manufacturing demands. 82% of ITPL 
respondents had less than 50 employees, while 52% of BIP respondents employed 
more than 500 people. Our in-depth case studies substantiate the survey results. 
For Companies A through D, lower labor cost and greater availability of labor were 
key factors in their decision to locate some of their production operations to Batam, 
while the ITPL firms cited the importance of skilled labor and the many educational 
institutions in and around Bangalore contributing to the pool of human talent as 
essential pull factors. 
 
Reliable infrastructure 
  Not unexpectedly, the reliable and efficient Singapore-styled infrastructure 
was the main draw of both BIP and ITPL. 85% of the BIP tenants and 82% of the 
ITPL tenants surveyed cited it as the main pull factor for them to locate in the 
Park. All our case study companies also cited the reliable infrastructure and 
efficient support services as significant pull factors, particularly for the software 
development and BPO companies (Companies E, F, and G), which require 
uninterrupted power supply and efficient communications infrastructure. 
 
Political commitment 
  Political commitment from the host government is another major concern 
for BIP tenants compared to ITPL tenants, indicated by the positive and 
statistically significant α2 (=1.992). This can be explained by the instability of 
Indonesia’s political system. The post-Suharto era was significant for BIP, as 
many firms pulled out of BIP during the political unrest. The situation was further 
exacerbated by the political uncertainties with the Indonesian presidency 
changing hands from Habibie to the first elected president, Abdurrahman Wahid, 
and finally to Megawati Sukarnoputri upon her predecessor’s impeachment. Key 
economic positions were reshuffled and economic advisors changed frequently, as 
power jockeying among the parties, ministries, legislature, central bank, and other 
institutions continued. All these serve to complicate investors’ assessment of 
Indonesia’s political outlook. Political commitment from both the Singapore and 
Indonesian governments became particularly important in keeping the tenants’ 
confidence in BIP. 
 
The post-investment constraints in BIP/ITPL (Table 4) 
  BIP is now an established industrial estate development. ITPL is relatively 
new. These parks have demonstrated the portability of the Singapore 
infrastructural model, and complemented Singapore’s inadequacies by taking 
advantage of comparative advantages overseas. However, while they may have 
attracted a sizeable number of investments, they have not met the expectations of 
the current tenants. Our study alludes to some emerging constraints that have 
undermined the attractiveness of the parks. These constraints are categorized into three broad groups: labor-related constraints, organization and technology-related 
constraints, and constraints relating to the economic “environment,” such as 
government policies and regulations.  
 
Labor-related constraints 
  The “cheap” labor resources that drew companies to BIP proved to be a 
perception rather than the reality, as “rising labor costs” was the main constraint 
faced by 78% of the BIP tenants surveyed. BIP tenants also found rising labor 
costs to be more of a concern than ITPL tenants as indicated by the positive and 
statistically significant β 3 (= 2.283). Other labor constraints experienced by BIP 
tenants (but less so by ITPL tenants) include the shortage of semi-skilled and 
skilled labor and industrial relations problems, as indicated by the positive and 
statistically significant β1 (= 2.770) and β4 (= 3.330). In fact, industrial relations 
problems were cited by Companies C and D as being very disruptive to the 
operations of the tenants in BIP, as workers unhappy with labor laws often resort 
to pressure tactics such as strikes, demonstrations, and work-to-rule. Coupled with 
low productivity, high absenteeism and poor work ethics, the cheap unit cost of 
labor often did not materialize into lower unit cost of production for the BIP 
tenants. 
 
Organizational/technological-related constraints 
  The Singapore-styled infrastructure, though reliable and efficient, also 
proved to be costly, as facilities such as the power plant, waste-treatment system 
and water supply are independently managed. This resulted in high overhead 
costs, especially in BIP where 74% of the respondents, and most of the case-study 
companies, cited it as a constraint they faced. This view was echoed less 
frequently (48%) by the ITPL tenants. Other organizational/technological 
constraints faced by BIP tenants (but not as much by ITPL tenants) include the 
lack of good supporting services (β3 = 2.504) and difficulty in introducing new 
technology and techniques (β2 = 2.541), both of which are positive and significant. 
 
“Environmental” constraints 
  “Environmental” constraints, or constraints specific to the operational 
environment, such as “impact of host government regulations” and “competition 
from overseas industry competitors,” were faced by both BIP and ITPL tenants. 
However, whereas 89% and 78% of BIP tenants cited the above two respective 
constraints, less than one-third of the ITPL tenants indicated likewise. This 
accounts for the positive and statistically significant β1 (=2.312) and β2 (=2.920) 
result. The government’s control over the operating environment and the 
economic landscape shaped by overseas industry competitors proved to be more 
stifling to the operations of the tenants in BIP than to those of tenants in ITPL. 
 
The strategic fit between the parks’ comparative advantages and firms’ 
competitive advantages 
  While tenants may encounter constraints in every park, the ultimate success 
of each park is truly measured by the strategic fit of the firms’ competitive advantages and the parks’ comparative advantages. Each of the four BIP companies 
believed that the savings in labor costs allowed them to capture competitive 
advantage in operations. However, these companies did not capture competitive 
advantage in the labor chain solely through reduced labor costs. Another related 
element of the functional differentiation is that, the relocation of labor-intensive 
operations to Batam was coupled with lower investments and therefore greater 
savings in production technology. This was due to a variety of factors: the difficulty 
in automating those processes; the use of low-cost labor as an alternative to 
investments in technology; the low skill of the labor force; and the maintenance and 
upgrading of the more automated operations in Singapore. In this sense, the 
functional and spatial differentiation of the value chain segment “operations” was 
used by those companies having production operations both in Singapore and in 
Batam to reduce labor costs and technology investment. Investment in high 
technology was reserved for operations in Singapore. In short, the search for cost 
advantages has led to a spatial fragmentation of the production process, and MNEs 
breaking their value-added chains across national borders to maximize the 
competitive advantages of the contiguous economies.  
  The tenants at ITPL pose a stark contrast to those of BIP, which has 
managed to attract a significant majority of their tenants on the basis of abundant 
low-cost, low-skilled labor. Our study suggests that the same advantages of 
plentiful labor and competitive labor costs have not been the sole influencing 
factor in attracting firms to the park. The primary reason that encouraged firms to 
settle in the park was the excellent infrastructural facilities and the Singapore-
styled management characterized by its quintessential efficiency. Anecdotal 
evidence from our case studies suggests that international IT firms have relocated 
to ITPL from other locations for this reason. ITPL represents a modified version 
of Porter’s analytical framework, whereupon ITPL has witnessed the location of 
firms engaged in marketing and sales and other services (viz., the primary 
activities), which were supported by other activities such as technological 
development and infrastructure within the park (viz., the secondary activities), 
sufficiently provided by the Singapore partner. A case in point is the rapid 
establishment of companies in the BPO industry and the myriad of e-services, 
including telemarketing and customer sales services, accomplished simply by 
making utmost use of the telecommunication facilities that the park showcased, as 
substantiated by our case studies. This, along with the advanced technology made 
available at ITPL, has helped make the park the sinecure of companies engaged in 
the non-manufacturing industries, that is, those placed in the higher end of the 
value chain.   
  To a large extent, the case-study parks have succeeded in providing the 
crucial links within the value-added chain that give client firms a competitive 
advantage. The problem lies on the flip side of the desired strategic fit – the host 
country’s ability to provide comparative advantages. In both scenarios, the host 
government has succeeded only in making available the advantages of “basic 
factors of production.” Thus, while the case-study parks do provide some 
components of comparative advantage which the host country does not, such as 
reliable infrastructure and political commitment from the Singapore government, the strategic intent of these flagship projects remains stymied by non-economic, 
socio-political complexities in the larger host environment. 
 
 
Issues and Challenges 
 
  The special privileges secured by Singapore’s overseas industrial township 
projects share a common trait: many of the privileges obtained were 
unprecedented and unique to the case-study parks. For instance, the Singapore 
partners were granted licenses to build and operate their own power and water 
treatment plants and telecommunication facilities, which, in Indonesia and India, 
was an exclusive concession. As such, the parks could leverage on their reputation 
of reliable infrastructural facilities in areas where these facilities were an anomaly. 
Moreover, since local government officials were usually part of the parks’ 
management boards, once-cumbersome bureaucratic procedures, such as 
investment approvals, construction activities, import/export permits, and 
immigration matters, became accelerated processes. The parks serve to attract 
investors with their formulaic one-stop service within a self-sufficient, self-
contained environment unburdened by inefficient administration. Significantly, 
Singapore’s positive reputation with multinational corporations for its stable, 
corruption-free investment environment lends credibility. 
  Influence can also be exerted through inter-governmental interaction and, 
where existing, through the links to influential ethnic business groups in the 
investment location who often rely on state patronage for their access to 
infrastructural development projects. The main Singapore partners involved in 
these projects were government-linked companies. For the Indonesian parks, the 
main local partner was the Salim Group, which, though private, is nevertheless 
well known for its close links to senior Indonesian politicians and privileged 
access to major investment projects. ITPL also shares the characteristic of strong 
government involvement, with the Indian counterparts being the Karnataka state 
government and the Tata Group, which, though private, is nonetheless well 
connected with local authorities. The strategic alliances between Singapore’s own 
state-owned enterprise networks and its counterparts in the regional sites were 
instrumental in mobilizing the financial resources to complete these mega-
projects within, in most cases, the comparatively short timeframe of 18 to 24 
months.  
  Nonetheless, as most openly admitted, the strategically “engineered” inter-
government endorsement of the flagship projects and the enormous resources 
mobilized through the strategic partnerships have “failed” to shield the parks from 
a gamut of problems.  
 
Heightened Competition 
  Singapore’s overseas industrial parks are increasingly facing strong 
competition from competing parks within their vicinity. Competitor parks, some 
of which are backed by prominent Indonesian politicians, have mushroomed 
around BIP. Panbil Industrial Park, for instance, is located directly opposite BIP, and offers similar factories at competitive rentals. The premium placed on the 
Park’s one-stop support service and self-sufficient operating environment is 
increasingly called into question. Additionally, competition is not limited to 
within Indonesia. Indonesia’s minimum wage, at US $43 to US $70 a month, 
depending on the region, prices it out of the global competition for cheap labor. 
Investors can get similarly-skilled labor from Bangladesh, Vietnam, and Sri 
Lanka at monthly wages of US $17, US $32, and US $40, respectively. Recent 
press reports on Riau’s investor exodus
10  cite sluggish bureaucracy, “rowdy” 
labor scenes, lack of legal certainty and security, and unclear investment policies 
as reasons for investors’ relocating their investments from Riau Province and 
Indonesia. Populist measures such as raising the minimum wages further heighten 
the reluctance of investors to pour money into the country. 
  ITPL’s success hinges on the “Singapore-styled design and management” 
reputation. However, the premium placed on ITPL’s formulaic “one-stop” service 
and self-sufficient infrastructure is similarly, and increasingly, eroded by intense 
competition from newer, though smaller, parks being developed by street-savvy 
Indian entrepreneurs, and ITPL’s capacity to provide stable electricity is the only 
differentiating factor from other IT parks like the Software Technology Park and 
Electronics City. These competitor parks market themselves aggressively on price, 
charging significantly lower rentals for “no-frills” factory space. As a case in 
point, ITPL’s listed lease price is Rs50 (approximately US$1) per square foot, 
whereas the rate in other areas, and within Electronic City itself, is less than Rs15. 
Our interviews with IPTL tenants have alluded to the possibility that the Park’s 
attractiveness may, in time, be eroded as more IT parks and companies are 
established within the vicinity to capitalize on the area’s repute, while offering 
lower rentals with reliable energy as the state develops. 
 
Political “Commitment” 
  Reliance on political patronage (and personal ties) rather than transparent 
contracts has had advantages and disadvantages. For BIP, the reliance on the 
Salim Group has been necessary in the context of the Indonesian system of “crony 
capitalism” fostered by then-President Suharto. The end of the Suharto era, and 
pressure from the IMF and western governments for financial transparency, has 
diminished Salim’s political and commercial influence. Ownership changes at 
BIP have brought about uncertainties
11 as the parks’ privileged access to senior 
politicians and policy-makers in Jakarta has proved more difficult. Compounding 
these uncertainties, post-Suharto inter-governmental endorsements no longer 
suffice to secure commitments at the lower tiers of government. Anecdotal 
evidence
12   points to a more complex regulatory environment for foreign 
companies, as they have to deal more intensively with the provincial and sub-
provincial (district) governments. The parks’ reputation as investment enclaves 
has also not been left unscathed by political developments in the aftermath of the 
Asian financial crisis, the September 11 attacks in the United States, the Bali and 
Jakarta-Marriott bomb blasts, and, more recently, negative press reports on active 
terrorist cells within the region. BIP could do without these added sentiments in 
its larger environment.   In India, varying degrees of commitment and support by different state 
governments towards the country’s development can affect ITPL’s competitive 
advantage. The lack of good supporting infrastructure in the surrounding 
environment and the disparity in local state-government supporting different cities 
serve as a deterrent to investors, even as cities like Hyderabad, Mumbai, and 
Chennai continue to advance technologically. Additionally, corruption remains 
endemic, and bureaucratic red-tape is difficult to circumvent. These 
considerations are by themselves deterrents to potential investors, even with 
Singapore’s presence and involvement. To hedge Singapore’s strategic interests in 
India, Ascendas is reportedly partnering India’s largest construction conglomerate, 
Larsen and Toubro, to build Cyber Pearl in Hyderabad’s Hitec City, while plans 
are in place to develop similar IT parks in Chennai and other Indian cities on a 
turnkey basis. 
 
Social Challenges 
  On a broader front, BIP’s development strategy envisaged a self-contained 
environment with minimal dependency on the surrounding environment. In reality, 
the island's reputation as a boom economy has overwhelmed Batam. The island’s 
population has more than tripled since 1990, with one in two new migrants living 
in illegal squatter housing, and 50,000 illegal houses are reportedly scattered 
throughout the island. Peachey et al. (1998), among others, have drawn attention 
to this influx of immigrants to the islands and, concomitantly, to the social 
problems of squatter settlements. There is much pressure to maintain, or even 
increase the investment value of BIP, without a shift of resources to meet the 
needs of the local community. Similarly, the quixotic success of ITPL has 
spawned competitor parks in the vicinity and with it the infrastructural 
bottlenecks which threaten to overwhelm the investment value of the Park. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
  The Singapore government’s role in developing, managing, and operating 
the overseas industrial parks has been crucial from the start. However, initial 
assumptions of the advantages engendered by its state enterprise strategy, as 
successfully proven through its GLC network domestically, were overly 
optimistic. Our study finds little evidence to show that these selective state 
interventions, in the form of Singapore-styled overseas industrial parks, were 
necessary, sufficient, or even successful in goading Singaporean firms to 
regionalize. BIP’s resemblance to a Japanese investment enclave and the limited 
impact of BIP on the transfer of low-value operations from Singaporean-owned 
firms are well documented (Peachey et al. 1998, Grundy-Warr et al. 1999, Yeoh 
et al. 2004b). Similarly, ITPL catered largely to global MNEs, with limited 
presence of Singaporean firms. Our study suggests that state entrepreneurship, 
and state enterprise networks, cannot substitute in situ for the lack of firm-specific 
competitive advantages necessary for indigenous (Singaporean) firms to 
regionalize.     In addition, the competitive advantages engendered by Singapore’s state 
enterprise network can be frustrated by the intricacies of socio-political realities in 
the host environments. Put simply, in the context of Singapore’s trans-border 
industrialization strategy, there is a pseudo-economic imperative for these 
competitive advantages to be cloned inside the Singapore-styled industrial parks, 
in strategic locations across the region. Our study suggests that there is naivete in 
the premise that these strategic advantages cannot be readily imitated, possibly to 
better effect, outside the case-study parks. The limits to Singapore’s strategy of 
state entrepreneurship, and that of its government-linked companies as 
entrepreneurial agents, have been exposed in these projects. 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes 
 
1   This research is funded by the Wharton-SMU Research Center, 
Singapore Management University. The authors would also like to express sincere 
thanks to the journal reviewers whose comments added substantially to the final 
presentation of this work. 
2 The transition from the role of a developmental state to that of an 
entrepreneurial one is well documented by Pereira (2004). 
3 This initiative initially sought to accelerate access to new technology, or 
foreign markets, by supporting Singapore companies to form joint ventures with 
overseas companies in Europe and North America. Most of these investments 
proved unsuccessful, resulting in enormous losses by the early 1990s 
(Balakrishnan 1991). 
4 The regionalization strategy had several thrusts, including the regional 
headquarters program (Perry 1995, Yeung 2001) and the regionalization of 
Singapore’s indigenous enterprises (SEDB 1995a, 1995b, Tan 1995, Yeung 1998). 
5 The cataclysmic collapse of oil prices in the early 1980s impressed upon 
Indonesia's economic planners the need for a more broad-based development 
strategy. Deregulatory measures were introduced to stimulate the non-oil sectors of 
the Indonesian economy. Infrastructural facilities were improved, and investment 
incentives were liberalised, to mobilise private sector investments, including 
foreign investments. The Riau islands were an obvious choice to encourage 
investments not least because Singapore has shown interest in leasing these nearby 
islands to transcend the city-state's need for inexpensive land and labor. By the late 
1980s, the perception from Jakarta was that Singapore was “bursting at the seams,” 
and that the time was right to position Batam and the other Riau islands to take 
advantage of the spillover from Singapore. 
6 The Singapore consortium was led by Singapore Technologies Industrial 
Corporation (now SembCorp Industries) and Jurong Town Corporation, 
Singapore’s main industrial estate infrastructure developer. 
 7 Indian universities reportedly graduate about 20,000 to 30,000 software 
engineers every year, and Bangalore has been a “hunting ground” for Singapore 
companies and Singapore-based multinationals seeking low-cost IT specialists. 
8 The Singapore consortium, Information Technology Park Investments 
Pte Ltd,  includes RSP Architects, Planners and Engineers, L&M Properties, 
Sembawang Industrial, Technology Parks (a Jurong Town Corporation subsidiary) 
and Parameswara Holdings (the investment arm of the Singapore Indian Chamber 
of Commerce). 
9 The Straits Times, 30 August 2003; The Straits Times, December 5, 
2003. 
10 The Indonesian Bank Restructuring Agency has reportedly offered to 
sell the Salim Group’s stakes in all the Riau projects – estimated to be worth 
S$500 million – in a packaged deal (The Business Times, August 28, 2001). 
Further restructuring have taken place, with the three main stakeholders now 
being SCI, Ascendas and the Indonesian government. 
11 Law No. 22/199 allows provincial, district and municipal governments 
to write provincial laws, some of which contradict national laws, or test the 
boundaries of their power. The Megawati administration is now proposing a 
revision of laws on regional autonomy, but the direction remains unclear (Van 
Zorge, Heffernan & Associates 2002). Interviews with BIP executives and tenants, 
in September 2002 and July 2003 have alluded to this changed operating 
environment. 
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3
 The transition from the role of a developmental state to that of an entrepreneurial one is well documented by 
Pereira (2004). 
4
  This initiative initially sought to accelerate access to new technology, or foreign markets, by supporting 
Singapore companies to form joint ventures with overseas companies in Europe and North America. Most of 
these investments proved unsuccessful, resulting in enormous losses by the early 1990s (Balakrishnan 1991). 
 
5
 The regionalization strategy had several thrusts, including the regional headquarters program (Perry 1995, 
Yeung 2001) and the regionalization of Singapore’s indigenous enterprises (SEDB 1995a, 1995b, Tan 1995, 
Yeung 1998). 
 
6
 The cataclysmic collapse of oil prices in the early 1980s impressed upon Indonesia's economic planners the 
need for a more broad-based development strategy. Deregulatory measures were introduced to stimulate the non-
oil sectors of the Indonesian economy. Infrastructural facilities were improved, and investment incentives were 
liberalised, to mobilise private sector investments, including foreign investments. The Riau islands were an obvious 
choice to encourage investments not least because Singapore has shown interest in leasing these nearby islands 
to transcend the city-state's need for inexpensive land and labor. By the late 1980s, the perception from Jakarta 
was that Singapore was “bursting at the seams,” and that the time was right to position Batam and the other Riau 
islands to take advantage of the spill-over from Singapore. 
 
7 The Singapore consortium was led by Singapore Technologies Industrial Corporation (now SembCorp 
Industries) and Jurong Town Corporation, Singapore’s main industrial estate infrastructure developer. 
 
8 Indian universities reportedly graduate about 20,000 to 30,000 software engineers every year, and Bangalore 
has been a “hunting ground” for Singapore companies and Singapore-based multinationals seeking low-cost IT 
specialists. 
 
9 The Singapore consortium, Information Technology Park Investments Pte Ltd,  includes RSP Architects, 
Planners and Engineers, L&M Properties, Sembawang Industrial, Technology Parks (a Jurong Town 
Corporation subsidiary) and Parameswara Holdings (the investment arm of the Singapore Indian Chamber of 
Commerce). 
10
 The Straits Times, 30 August 2003; The Straits Times, December 5, 2003. 
 
11
 The Indonesian Bank Restructuring Agency has reportedly offered to sell the Salim Group’s stakes in all the 
Riau projects – estimated to be worth S$500 million – in a packaged deal (The Business Times, August 28, 
2001). Further restructuring have taken place, with the three main stakeholders now being SCI, Ascendas and 
the Indonesian government. 
 
12
 Law No. 22/199 allows provincial, district and municipal governments to write provincial laws, some of which 
contradict national laws, or test the boundaries of their power. The Megawati administration is now proposing a 
revision of laws on regional autonomy, but the direction remains unclear (Van Zorge, Heffernan & Associates 
2002). Interviews with BIP executives and tenants, in September 2002 and July 2003 have alluded to this 
changed operating environment. 